84-1306

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ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,
CLERK

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF UNITED STATES
October Term, 1984

No. _____

CHARLES B. BAKER, JR., Petitioner,

vs.

JOAN A. BAKER, Respondent

Petition For A Writ of Certiorari To The
Supreme Judicial Court Of The
State of Maine

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Counsel for Petitioner

January 18, 1985

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether judicial inquiry into the adequacy of attempted service of process is constitutionally required before the authorization of service by publication?

LIST OF PARTIES.

Petitioner: Charles B. Baker, Jr. of LaJolla, County of San Diego and State of California

Respondent: Joan A. Baker of Washington Depot, County of Litchfield and State of Connecticut

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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1984

No. _____

CHARLES B. BAKER, JR., Petitioner

vs.

JOAN A. BAKER, Respondent

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
OF THE STATE OF MAINE

The petitioner, Charles B. Baker, Jr., respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment

and opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court for the State of Maine entered in this proceeding on November 1, 1984.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of the State of Maine, issued but not yet reported, appears in the Appendix hereto.

JURISDICTION

The Judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court was entered on November 1, 1984. This petition for certiorari was filed within 90 days of that date. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1257(3).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves construction in a constitutional context of Maine District Civil Rule 4(g), which is set forth fully in the Appendix at Page 32.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner and Respondent were

divorced by order of the Ninth District Court, Division of Southern Cumberland, State of Maine dated September 21, 1973.

Respondent filed a Complaint for Enforcement of Decree of Court on July 6, 1982. The presiding Judge ordered service of process upon Petitioner by certified mail, return receipt requested and set a hearing date. On December 13, 1982, Respondent filed an Affidavit of Counsel with the Court stating that they had been unable to locate Petitioner at several addresses and requested ex parte that the Court allow service by mail to an attorney in California allegedly representing Petitioner in the matter of the probate of Petitioner's mother's estate, as well as by regular mail to Petitioner himself at an address given in the Court papers of his mother's estate. By order of Court dated December

17, 1982, the Court authorized this procedure. Counsel for Petitioner entered a special appearance and moved to dismiss the Complaint for inadequate service. As Maine District Court Rules of Civil Procedure 80(j) and 4(f) provide only for personal service in post-divorce motions, the motion was granted on February 10, 1983. Upon Respondent's oral motion, the Court ordered Service by Registered Mail upon the Petitioner at the address given in the probate papers of his mother's estate with a copy sent by regular mail to the California attorney supposedly representing him in that matter. The hearing was set for March 23, at which time Petitioner appeared specially and moved to dismiss based upon lack of jurisdiction because of inadequate service. This motion was again granted. Upon an oral motion for alternative service, without any showing

of a diligent effort to locate Petitioner, the Court set a new hearing date and ordered notice of hearing be sent to Petitioner by five simultaneous methods: certified mail, return receipt requested; regular mail with a request to forward, if necessary; ordinary mail to California counsel with a specific request to forward to Petitioner; and the Court also ordered notice by Publication and a diligent effort for service by hand. Maine District Court Rules of Civil Procedure 4(g) provides that service by publication may be utilized only upon Motion and showing that service with due diligence cannot be made by another prescribed method. On May 13, 1983 the same Court found that service was complete by finding that Respondent had complied with its order, despite the fact that there had been no attempt to personally serve the Petitioner prior to

the Order for alternative service, and without inquiry into the success of the other, unauthorized, means of service. Counsel for Petitioner again appeared specially and moved to dismiss based upon lack of personal jurisdiction due to constitutionally deficient service. The motion was denied and the hearing on the merits of the complaint scheduled. On May 18, 1983, counsel for Petitioner filed a Motion for Specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which motion requested the Court to adduce findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the following questions:

1. In what manner the court found that Respondent had shown that service upon Petitioner could not with due diligence be made by any method other than by publication; and
2. Whether the Court found that

attempted service of process upon Petitioner pursuant to D.C.Civ.R. 4(f) was sufficient for a showing of due diligence on the part of the Respondent to serve Petitioner?

The Court's findings and conclusions were entered on May 26, 1983, and appear as Appendix at page 36.

The hearing on the merits of Respondent's motion was had on June 8, 1983. After hearing Respondent's oral testimony, and denying Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the Court entered an Order (Appendix at page 38) for alimony arrearages in a total amount of Fifteen Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($15,600.00). The Court further ordered that the Petitioner provide evidence to the Respondent that a life insurance policy in the amount of One Hundred

Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) was then maintained for the benefit of Repondent.

Petitioner timely appealed the District Court's decision to the Superior Court.

On December 14, 1983, the Superior Court heard Respondent's appeal from the June 8, 1983, Order of the District Court. The sole issue of law before the Court was the propriety of the District Court's grant of a motion for alternate service. Petitioner objected again on, inter alia, constitutional grounds. The Court denied Petitioner's appeal and awarded fees.

After entry of the Superior Court's Order, counsel for Petitioner filed a Motion for Specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Motion for Relief from Order and Motion for Correction of tne Docket. These were denied.

Petitioner timely filed an appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of the State of Maine.

Petitioner raised, inter alia, the issue of whether the Court had personal jurisdiction on the matter based upon the constitutional insufficiency of the service of process. Oral argument was held on September 11, 1984 and the decision rendered and docketed on November 1, 1984. This Petition was timely filed thereafter.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. Important Federal Question

The central issue in this case is whether or not the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment require judicial inquiry into the adequacy of attempted personal service before the authorization of service of process by publication. In the case at hand, Respondent first attempted to mail

process to the Petitioner, a method not allowed under the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court upon oral motion and without previously ordering service in hand, then ordered service by publication at the same time as other methods of service, and determined that service was complete upon notification that the execution of the methods chosen, including publication, had been accomplished, i.e., that the letters had been mailed, and process sent to a deputy for service. No inquiry was held into whether or not any of these methods of service other than publication had been successful.

This Court has long indicated that service of process by publication over non-residents is disfavored and in many cases constitutionally inadequate. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714; Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Company, 339

U.S. 306. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, Section 25 at 109. Service of process by publication is still frequently utilized, however, and its most frequent use is in the type of case where most citizens have their only contact with the judicial system; i.e., small actions concerning domestic relations, quiet enjoyment of property, termination of parental rights and probate. While the dollar amounts are usually small, the property or other rights involved are paramount to those concerned and this court has frequently reached out to protect them. Service of process in divorce is such an interest. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220.

Due process requires that notice be reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present

their objections. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385.

There are circumstances where employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification is all that the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing a person's rights. Connlius v. Reading School District, 198 U.S. 458.

This Court, however, has not committed itself to the specific requirement of an inquiry into the circumstances of the case and the success, or likelihood of success, of personal service. Neither has it adopted any specific formula balancing the process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard against the occasional need of expedience in order to allow persons to solve their problems and

go about their affairs. This requirement and this balancing, however, is implicit in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company, supra, as well as other cases and has been recognized by the writers of the various State and Federal Procedural Rules. Maine Rules of Civil Procedure 4(g) requires this hearing, and the Advisory Committee, in their notes, cite Mullane and make clear, if not explicit, that a judicial inquiry is required into the prior attempts of service, and that service by publication is available only after a showing of the diligence to get service by another prescribed method more likely to give actual notice to the defendant. 1 Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine Civil Practice, 95 (1970).

In the case at bar, the Court failed to require the Respondent to utilize personal service, the best

possible form of service, prior to authorizing service by publication. It is necessary for this Court to accept this case to announce with clarity the requirement for this inquiry and the standards by which the requirement of personal service can be forgone.

II. Failure to Require Personal Service Prior to Publication is not Harmless Error

The Supreme Judicial Court of the State of Maine, in addressing the District Court's failure to require personal service prior to authorization of service by publication, deemed this to be harmless error, noting that the Petitioner had actual notice. When notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to

accomplish it. The reasonableness and hence the Constitutional validity of any chosen method must be defended as to its reasonableness. Compare Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U.S. 352 with Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13. As publication is the least likely to satsify due process requirements, specific judicial inquiry must be made prior to its use. One measure of reasonableness is strict compliance with the Rules of Procedure. The District Court, after inquiry, may rightly decide that the facts of this case warrant service by publication upon the Petitioner. What is missing in this instant case, however, is this inquiry: the right of this Petitioner and of all similary situated defendants to the certainty that an independent body has determined that the best efforts of the Plaintiff at the best possible service have been exhausted before publication is

authorized. To deny this inquiry to the Petitioner is to authorize by oversight a process in which there are no strict safeguards to ensure the use of the best possible form of notice and which, by inaction, severly undercuts the due process guarantees of notice and hearing.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, a Writ of Certiorari should issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of the State of Maine.

Respectfully submitted,



Joseph H. Field, Esq.



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APPENDIX I

Reporter of Decisions

Decision No. 3642

Law Docket No. Cum-84-58

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

JOAN A. BAKER

v.

CHARLES B. BAKER, JR.

Argued September 11, 1984

Decided November 1, 1984

Before McKUSICK, C.J., and NICHOLS, VIOLETTE, WATHEN, GLASSMAN, and SCOLNIK, JJ.

GLASSMAN, J.

The defendant, Charles B. Baker, Jr., appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court, Cumberland County, affirming the judgment of the District Court and

awarding plaintiff attorney's fees. We affirm the judgment except as to the attorney's fees.

Joan Baker was divorced from her husband Charles Baker on September 21, 1973. The District Court judgment ordered the defendant, inter alia, to pay Joan Baker $1,200.00 a month as alimony, payable on the first day of each month until her death or remarriage; and to maintain $100,000 of life insurance on his life for her benefit so long as the defendant has outstanding alimony obligations to her with evidence provided to her annually of payment of the premiums.

On August 16, 1979, the defendant filed a motion for modication of the divorce judgment requesting termination of his alimony obligations. There followed a relatively extensive period of discovery. On June 1, 1982, the

defendant filed a notice of dismissal of his motion.

Joan Baker then filed a motion for enforcement of the judgment. The court allowed the plaintiff to amend her motion to include a prayer for past due installments of alimony and attorney's fees. The defendant secured a dismissal of the plaintiff's amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction of the defendant.

The plaintiff's later motion for enforcement of the divorce judgment was again ordered dismissed for want of personal jurisdiction, after hearing on March 25, 1983, of the defendant's motion to dismiss. Simultaneously, the court granted the plaintiff's oral motion for alternative service on the defendant of the plaintiff's refiled motion for enforcement and scheduled it for hearing. The court ordered that, if after a

diligent effort by the plaintiff personal service of the defendant could not be effected, the defendant could be served by publication of notice, by certified mail to the defendant's last known California address, and by ordinary mail to California counsel with a specific request that it be forwarded to the defendant. At the hearing, the defendant again moved to dismiss the plaintiff's motion for lack of jurisdiction of the defendant. The court entered its order finding that the plaintiff had complied with the March 25, 1983, order, denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, and set the plaintiff's motion for hearing on its merits. Following a June 21, 1983, hearing on the plaintiff's motion, the court entered a judgment for the plaintiff.

On appeal to the Superior Court, the defendant argued that the District

Court had erroneously granted the plaintiff's motion for alternative service of the plaintiff's post-judgment motion for enforcement of the divorce judgment. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court and awarded the plaintiff' attorney's fees. The defendant appeals from this judgment.

The defendant concedes that his substantial rights were not affected, but argues that the District Court erred in permitting concurrent proof of due diligence in attempting to effect personal service and of publication of service upon the defendant. M.R. Civ. P. 80(j) governs service of process in post-

judgment divorce proceedings.1 The defendant asserts that service by publication is available only after compliance with the conditions of M.R. Civ. P. 4(g)(1), made applicable in the District Court by M.D.C. Civ. R. 4, which Rule 80(j) incorporates by reference.

M.R. Civ. P. 80(j)m made applicable in the District Court by M.D.C. Civ. R. 80, provides:

> Manner of Service on Divorce Motions. Any proceedings for modification or enforcement of the judgment in an action for divorce shall be on motion, a copy of which together with notice of hearing thereof shall be served in accordance with Rule 4, except that service within the state shall be by delivery to the party personally unless otherwise ordered by the court.

M.R. Civ. P. 4(g)(1) provides:

> The court, on motion upon a showing that service cannot with due diligence be made by another prescribed method, shall order service by publication in an action described in subdivision (f) of this rule, unless a statute provides another method of notice, or when the person to be served is one described in subdivision (e) of this rule.

The defendant maintains there is nothing in the record to show the plaintiff attempted with due diligence to serve the defendant personally prior to the District Court's March 25, 1983, order and, therefore, any method of alternative service was improper. Service by publication is in order, the defendant asserts,

> [O]nly upon failure after using diligence to get service by another prescribed method more likely to give actual notice to the Defendant, and then only upon Order of Court.

1 Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine Civil Procedures at 95 (2d ed. 1970). We disagree.

In Elliot v. Elliot, 431 A.2d 55, 57 (Me. 1981), we held that a "post-judgment motion is not original process, and that a court has continuing jurisdiction over the parties to enforce any judgment entered against a defendant over whom personal jurisdiction has been obtained." We further explained that the requirements of Rule 80(j) are not jurisdictional, but procedural, designed to assure the non-moving party of actual notice of any pending motion. Id. Morever, we have noted the Rule's

underlying intent to avoid the practical problem unique to post-divorce judgment motions.

> Such motions are often brought several years after the judgment, and service upon the attorney of record in the original proceedings imposes an undue burden upon the attorney who may have long been out of touch with the party.

2 Field, McKusick & Wroth, supra, at 270. Rule 80(j) recognizes the possible inadequacy of service upon the original attorney of record to notify properly the affected parties. Most v. Most, 470 A.2d 250, 259 (Me. 1984).

The defendant's appeal addresses none of the concerns of Rule 80(j). The defendant does not allege the lack of actual notice or the impairment of any substantial right. Accordingly, we must view any procedural error in the District

Court order as harmless under M.D.C. Civ. R. 61.2 Farrell v. Theriault, 464 A.2d 188, 192 (Me. 1983).

M.D.C. Civ. R. 61 provides:

> No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by and of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial of the parties.

Remanded to the Superior Court for remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent

with the opinion herein.

All concurring.

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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Maine Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Box 368, Portland, Me. 04112, of any typographical or other formal errors before the opinion goes to press.

Finally, the defendant objects to the award by the Superior Court of the plaintiff's counsel fees on appeal. We have noted before that motions for attorney's fees on appeal properly lie in the hearing court on remand. Prue v. Prue, 420 A.2d 257, 260 (Me. 1980). We agree that appropriate procedure here required the Superior Court to remand the case to the District Court for the purpose of entertaining the plaintiff's motion. I. Accordingly, we vacate

that portion of the judgment.

The entry is:

> Judgment affirmed except as to attorney's fees.
>
> Judgment awarding the plaintiff attorney's fees is vacated.

APPENDIX II

Maine District Court Civil Rules of Procedure 4(f):

(f) Service Outside State by Mail In Certain Actions. Where service cannot, with due diligence, be made personally within the state, service of the summons and complaint may be made upon a person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state be delivery to him outside the state by registered or certified mail, with restricted delivery and return receipt requested, in the following cases:

(1) Where the pleading demands a judgment that the person to be served be excluded from a vested or contingent interest in or lien upon specific real or personal property within the state; or that such an interest or lien in favor of either party by enforced, regulated,

defined or limited; or otherwise affecting the title to any property; or

(2) Where the pleading demands a judgment for divorce or declaring a marriage a nullity.

Service by registered or certified mail shall be complete when the registered or certified mail is delivered and the return receipt signed or when acceptance is refused, provided that the plaintiff shall file with the court either the return receipt or, if acceptance was refused, an affidavit that upon notice of such refusal a copy of the summons and complaint was sent to the defendant by ordinary mail.

As amended Nov. 2, 1959, eff. Dec. 1, 1959; eff. Feb. 2, 1976; Aug. 7, 1981.

APPENDIX III

Maine District Court Civil Rules of Procedure 4(g)(l):

(g) Service by Publication.

(l) WHEN SERVICE MAY BE MADE. The court, on motion upon a showing that service cannot with due diligence be made by another prescribed method, shall order service by publication in an action described in subdivision (f) of this rule, unless a statute provides another method of notice, or when the person to be serviced is one described in subdivision (e) of this rule.

APPENDIX IV

Maine District Court Civil Rules of Procedure 80(j):

(j) Manner of service on Divorce Motions. Any proceedings for modification or enforcement of the judgment in an action for divorce shall be on motion, a copy of which together with notice of hearing thereof shall be served in accordance with Rule 4, except that service within the state shall be by delivery to the party personally unless otherwise ordered by the court. Added eff. Feb. 1, 1960; amended eff. Aug. 1, 1962; Nov. 15. 1976; July 21, 1877; Aug. 7, 1981.

APPENDIX V

STATE OF MAINE	DISTRICT COURT
Cumberland, ss.	District Nine
	Div. So. Cumberland
	Civil Action,
	Docket No. 996/72-73

JOAN A. BAKER,	*	
Plaintiff	*	
vs.	*	ORDER
CHARLES B. BAKER,	*	
Defendant	*	

It is found that the Plaintiff has complied with the Order of this Court, dated March 25, 1983, in service of process on Defendant. It is therefore Ordered that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is DENIED.

It is further Ordered that a hearing be scheduled on the merits and

that Defendant be notified of this date by ordinary mail to the address set forth in the March 25th Order. In addition, Defendant's counsel Dennis Patterson, who appeared specially shall be notified of the hearing date by ordinary mail.

DATED: May 13, 1983

/s/ Harriet P. Henry

Harriet P. Henry

Judge, District Court

APPENDIX VI

STATE OF MAINE
Cumberland, ss.

DISTRICT COURT
District Nine
Div. So. Cumberland
Civil Action,
Docket No. 996/72-73

JOAN A. BAKER,
Plaintiff
vs.
CHARLES B. BAKER,
Defendant

SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. In Response to Question one:

The Plaintiff has done everything the Court has Ordered her to do per Order dated May 13, 1983 which was proceeded by attempts to serve the Defendant by registered mail and to attempt to locate the Defendant through law offices in California, which had had correspondence

with Plaintiff's attorney in Maine;

2. In Response to Question Two:

Yes the Court finds that attempted service of process upon the Defendant pursuant to D.C. Civ. R. 4(f) is sufficient for a showing of due diligence on the part of Plaintiff to serve Defendant.

DATED: May 26, 1983

/s/ Harriet P. Henry

Harriet P. Henry

Judge, District Court

APPENDIX VII

STATE OF MAINE — DISTRICT COURT
Cumberland, ss. — District Nine
Div. So. Cumberland
Civil Action,
Docket No. 996/72-73

JOAN A. BAKER, *
Plaintiff *
vs. * ORDER
CHARLES B. BAKER, *
Defendant *

This matter came on for hearing on June 8, 1983, on Plaintiff's Motion for Enforcement of Decree of Alimony.

It is hereby Ordered that Plaintiff's Motion for Enforcement of Alimony is granted and

1. That judgment be entered for the Plaintiff for alimony

arrearages for the months of June, 1982, through June, 1983, in the amount of One Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($1,200.00) per month, for a total amount due of Fifteen Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($15,600.00), and that execution shall issue forthwith; and

2. That the Defendant be required to provide evidence to the Plaintiff that an insurance policy in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) is currently maintained for the benefit of the Plaintiff, in accordance with paragraph one of the Settlement Agreement, approved and incorporated as part of the Divorce Judgment issued by this Court on September 21, 1973,

and that such evidence be provided to the Plaintiff within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order; and that

3. Evidence be provided to the Plaintiff on an annual basis beginning one year from thirty (30) days of the date of this Order.

DATED: June 21, 1983

/s/ Emanuelson, J.

Judge, District Court

Office - Supreme Court, U.S.
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IN THE
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October Term, 1984

No. 84-1306

CHARLES B. BAKER, JR., Petitioner

vs.

JOAN A. BAKER, Respondent

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

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April 12, 1985

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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1984

No. 84-1306

CHARLES B. BAKER, JR., Petitioner

vs.

JOAN A. BAKER, Respondent

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine was unreported at the time the Petition was filed. It appears at 483 A.2d 733 (Me. 1984).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner and respondent were divorced and a divorce judgment was entered by the Ninth District Court, Division of Southern Cumberland, State of Maine, on September 21, 1973. That judgment ordered petitioner to pay respondent $1,200 per month as alimony, until the death or remarriage of the respondent. The petitioner subsequently moved to California. By letter to the respondent dated June 2, 1982, the petitioner informed her that no further alimony payments would be made.[1]

The respondent attempted to enforce payment of the alimony arrearages in the Maine District Court on several occasions, beginning with the filing of a Complaint for Enforcement of Decree of Court in July, 1982.[2] By order dated July 6, 1982, the court directed that service of the respondent's complaint be made upon the petitioner by certified mail, return receipt re-

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1. Prior to that date, petitioner had engaged Maine counsel and had brought, in the same district court, a Motion to Amend the Divorce Decree, seeking to reduce the alimony payments ordered. Petitioner's motion was withdrawn by counsel's letter to the Court dated June 1, 1982.

2. Pursuant to Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, §252, respondent initially brought an action for summary process against petitioner to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for failure to comply with so much of the divorce judgment as required him to pay alimony to the respondent. This complaint was dismissed in February, 1983. Respondent subsequently brought motions for enforcement of decree of alimony under Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, §774, which, on motion to enforce a decree of alimony, authorizes the court to make a finding of money due, render judgment for that amount and order alternate methods of collecting the judgment, including attachment and garnishment of wages.

quested. By affidavit dated December 13, 1982, the respondent's attorney stated that the certified letters were returned marked "unclaimed" despite efforts to serve the petitioner by mailing plain envelopes from Portland, Maine and from Washington, D.C., to two separate addresses which the respondent had been informed were possible residences of the petitioner. The affidavit also stated that messages had been left on petitioner's telephone answering machine, and that an investigation was made to determine the petitioner's current address and the name of a California attorney known to be representing the petitioner in unrelated probate proceedings. The investigation showed the address listed by the petitioner for the probate proceedings was P.O. Box 911, Del Mar, California, the identical post office box address formerly used in petitioner's June 2, 1982 letter to the respondent, and that the attorney was Richard Kinney, Esq.

Counsel for petitioner entered his special appearance on January 11, 1983. Following a hearing in February, 1983, the District Court dismissed the respondent's amended Complaint for Enforcement of Alimony for lack of personal jurisdiction[3] in that no proper service of the complaint upon the petitioner was demonstrated by the record. The court then entered its order that a hearing on any subsequent motion for enforcement to be filed by respondent be held on March 23, 1983, and that notice of the hearing be given to the petitioner by certified mail, addressed to him at P.O. Box 911, Del Mar, California, return receipt requested, pursuant to Maine District Court Civil Rule 4(f), with a copy of the order and of the motion to be sent by ordinary mail

3. Throughout the proceedings in Maine, petitioner contended that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him due to the alleged deficiencies in service of process. Since the parties were divorced in Maine, the State retained personal jurisdiction over the parties for the purpose of any future amendments to or enforcement of the decree. *Elliot v. Elliot*, 431 A.2d 55, 57 (Me. 1981). The petitioner is entitled to reasonable notice of such further proceedings, *Griffin v. Griffin*, 327 U.S. 220 (1946), but as the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine recently decided in *Elliot*, service of post judgment divorce motions is a matter of procedure, not jurisdiction.

to Richard R. Kinney, Esq., petitioner's attorney for his mother's estate proceedings.[4]

At a third hearing on March 23, 1983, the court had before it the affidavit of respondent's attorney dated March 16, 1983, in which he detailed his correspondence with California counsel (another attorney in the firm of Richard Kinney) in attempting to negotiate a resolution of the alimony dispute, and attached as exhibits copies of the letters from California counsel. These letters not only included the accurate Maine District Court docket number for the proceedings, but included the statement that, "this office represents Mr. Baker for the purpose of attempting to negotiate a resolution of the referenced dispute." Respondent's attorney further swore to his continued efforts to track down Mr. Baker by mail.

The court again dismissed respondent's Motion for Enforcement for lack of personal jurisdiction, but, upon the motion of the respondent, ordered on March 25, 1983 that alternate service of a subsequent motion for enforcement be made by the following means: sending to petitioner a notice of the hearing by certified mail at the Del Mar, California post office box address; mailing notice of the hearing to that address, by ordinary mail with a request to forward, if necessary; sending by ordinary mail notice of hearing to Richard R. Kinney, Esq.; publishing notice in accordance with Maine District Court Civil Rule 4(g); and making a diligent and earnest effort to serve petitioner in hand. The court stated that if after diligent effort by the respondent, personal service of the petitioner could not be effected, com-

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4. As of March 23, 1983, the postal authorities had neither returned the receipt nor the envelope marked "unclaimed" or "refused" from California. The envelope addressed to petitioner was eventually returned marked "unclaimed" on April 22, 1983, nearly two months after it was mailed.

   Rule 4(f) permits service of a non-resident defendant by registered or certified mail, with restricted delivery and return receipt requested, in only two types of actions: an original action for a divorce judgment or an action affecting the interest in or title to real property. In all other proceedings, a non-resident defendant who is subject to the jurisdiction of the state must be served either personally, Rule 4(e), or by publication, Rule 4(g).

pliance with the other methods of service would be sufficient.

On May 11, 1983, the petitioner again moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The affidavit of respondent's attorney dated May 10, 1983, was submitted to the court, showing full compliance with the court's order of March 25, 1983. The affidavit described further unsuccessful efforts by the respondent to serve personally the petitioner, including as an exhibit the Declaration for Publication of Michael Monzone, a San Diego County, California, registered process server. Monzone's affidavit detailed his extensive efforts to locate the petitioner, but concluded that he was unable to determine the whereabouts of the petitioner in San Diego County. Finally, submitted to the court was the letter which had been sent certified mail to the petitioner on March 29, 1983, and although marked with a "return" stamp by the Post Office, was not marked either "refused," "accepted," or "unclaimed."

On May 13, 1983, the District Court entered its order finding that the respondent had complied with the court's order of March 25, 1983, and therefore denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court's specific findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered on May 26, 1983, in which the court found that respondent's attempts to serve petitioner through registered mail and through petitioner's counsel in California constituted a sufficient showing of due diligence to authorize service by publication.

On June 21, 1983, the District Court granted respondent's Motion for Enforcement of Alimony and entered judgment for the respondent in the amount of $15,600.00.

The respondent concurs in so much of the Statement of the Case as presented by the petitioner which recites the procedural history of the case thereafter.

REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE DENIED

1. JUDICIAL INQUIRY INTO THE ADEQUACY OF SUBSTITUTED SERVICE IS ALREADY CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED BY *MULLANE V. CENTRAL HANOVER BANK & TRUST CO.*, AND NO MORE RIGID FORMULA IS NECESSARY.

The petitioner asks this Court to establish a standard to determine the reasonableness and sufficiency of notice of process which, in fact, has existed since 1950. In *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 311 (1950), the Court was presented with the need to balance the individual's right to due process against the interest of the state to bring issues to final settlement, and established the minimum requirements of due process as "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." *Id.* at 314; *cited in: Greene v. Lindsey,* 456 U.S. 444, 449 (1982); *Walker v. City of Hutchinson,* 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956). Recognizing the fallacy of dictating rules governing notice which could in all cases meet this requirement, the Court concluded that:

> "the means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected, . . . or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes."[5]

Mullane at 315.

Although personal service guarantees actual notice of the pendency of a legal action, certain less rigorous notice procedures have been accepted in light of the practical obstacles to providing personal service in every instance, provided that the constitutional minimum recited in *Mullane* is met. *See: Greene* at 455.

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5. In *Mullane,* the Court concluded that notice by publication to those individuals with vested rights in a trust fund, and whose addresses were readily available to the trustee, was invalid. The Court specifically recognized that mailed notice to known beneficiaries would be a valid alternative, and did not require personal service. *Id.* at 319.

This Court has refused to establish a more rigid standard than that declared in *Mullane*, and in so doing, has declined to elevate form over substance. "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." *Morrissey v. Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). *See: Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy*, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). Similarly, the Court has called attention to "the impossibility of setting up a rigid formula as to the kind of notice that must be given; notice required will vary with circumstances and conditions." *Walker v. City of Hutchinson*, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956).

The involved factual history and circumstances of this case prove the need for a flexible approach to due process procedures. No single formula beyond *Mullane's* directives could be created which could anticipate the myriad circumstances confronting litigants who must substitute alternatives to service in hand. *Mullane's* guidelines permitted the Maine District Court to fashion, within the statutory framework, an order which was reasonably calculated under the circumstances to apprise this particular non-resident defendant of the action brought against him.

Judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of substituted service is constitutionally required, but petitioner's contention that the District Court's inquiry was mis-timed is not only erroneous, but when viewed in light of the circumstances of the case and the actual notice to the petitioner, does not rise to an issue of constitutional dimension. *Cox v. Cox*, 457 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1972); *cf: Greene* at 453 (statute permitting posting of notice of forcible entry and detainer action in a conspicuous place on the premises was unlikely to provide tenants with actual notice of action.) If the courts are not allowed flexibility in interpreting and applying, under the circumstances of each case, their own rules regarding service of out-of-state defendants, those defendants who wish to turn the courts into sporting arenas will prevail.

2. THE JUDICIAL INQUIRY INTO THE ADEQUACY OF ATTEMPTED SERVICE WAS SUFFICIENT.

The petitioner argues that the respondent failed to comply strictly with Maine District Court Rule of Civil Procedure 4(g), and accordingly his due process rights were violated. He contends that the District Court's Order dated March 25, 1983, by simultaneously permitting service by publication and requiring a showing by the respondent of a diligent effort to serve the petitioner personally, was a violation of due process rights that would not have occurred if a prior separate judicial inquiry had been conducted into the diligence of respondent in attempting to serve petitioner. This argument overlooks the fact that the court made a series of inquiries, including the February, 1983 hearing, and its review of the affidavits submitted by respondent's counsel on December 13, 1982, and March 16, 1983, to determine the precise efforts counsel had employed to locate the petitioner. This latter affidavit incorporated copies of letters from petitioner's California counsel specifically seeking to negotiate the underlying alimony dispute.

Petitioner rests his entire argument on the insignificant question of whether a separate judicial inquiry into the diligence used by a plaintiff in serving an out-of-state defendant must be held before it will issue an order of publication. After service by publication was completed, a showing of due diligence was made, and the court satisfied itself that personal service could not have been made and that the alternative service previously authorized had been properly effected. The court entered its specific findings of fact, stating that respondent's prior attempts to serve petitioner and petitioner's California counsel constituted a sufficient showing of due diligence to authorize service by publication. The petitioner conceded that his substantive rights were not affected by this judicial timing. *Baker v. Baker,* 483 A.2d 733, 734 (Me. 1984). To allow a defendant to insist upon the precise order of service, even though he has in no way been prejudiced, is the essence of formalism. The purpose of service of process is to apprise the defendant that suit has been brought against him and to give him an opportunity to defend. *Mullane* at 314. Once it is found that this purpose has been

served, the inquiry should come to an end.[6]

Here, the petitioner had actual notice of the proceedings, and the respondent provided notice to the petitioner and his counsel of record in California by mail. The notice by mail, although not required by the Maine District Court Civil Rules, was a method added by the court as a reasonable means of providing notice to the petitioner. This Court has often noted that the mails provide an efficient and inexpensive means of communication which enhances the reliability of an otherwise unreliable notice procedure. *Mullane* at 319; *Greene* at 455. No due process violations exist. *Cox v. Cox* 457 F.2d 1190 (10th Cir. 1972) (notice by publication coupled with notice by mail to defendant and service upon defendant's attorney in most recent divorce proceedings did not violate due process); *Lehner v. U.S.*, 685 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1982) (actual notice received by defendant; formal written notice of mortgage foreclosure sale not required); *FDIC v. Spartan Mining Co., Inc.*, 96 F.R.D. 677 (S.D. W.Va. 1983) (delivery of summons and complaint to corporate address and actual notice of individual defendants who were officers of corporation held sufficient).

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6. Further, petitioner erroneously states that after the March 25, 1983 Order was entered, "no inquiry was held into whether or not any of these methods of service other than publication had been successful." *Petition for Certiorari* at 9. On May 11, 1983, the court heard respondent's counsel regarding the attempts to complete service under the five-step order of service and received the affidavit of respondent's counsel, dated May 10, 1983, along with the letter sent by registered mail to the petitioner, returned to respondent's attorney by the Post Office.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully Submitted,

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